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 ______________________________________________________________________________________________  
INTRODUCTION 
Although data on the carcinogenicity of 
agricultural pesticides are still being generated and 
are thus incomplete, research such as the 
Agricultural Health Study indicates that popula-
tions with increased, regular exposure to pesticides 
have high rates of a variety of cancers (National 
Institutes of Health & Environmental Protection 
Agency 2008). Policies that regulate toxins such as 
pesticides are envisioned by the public to be 
empirical and objective, but toxins are socially 
produced and their regulation is just as often based 
on political and economic factors as it is on science 
(Luke 2000). This does not bode well for farm- 
workers who are simultaneously burdened by 
disproportionate exposure to pesticides, low 
socioeconomic status, and political disenfranchise-
ment—factors that can prohibit them from 
accomplishing change. The social, political, and 
economic barriers that farmworkers have historically 
faced are so deeply intertwined and embedded that 
the community remains unable to address the 
environmental injustice of adverse occupational 
exposure through current pesticide policy. 
BACKGROUND 
In 2001-2002, 75% of farmworkers in the 
United States were born in Mexico (US 
Department of Labor 2005). In general, the 
nation’s farmworkers suffer from poor health. 
Health problems commonly reported at migrant 
health centers include upper respiratory infections, 
hypertension, diabetes, dermatitis, urinary tract 
infections, anemia, and gastroenteritis. Other 
problems common among farmworkers that may 
not be reported to clinics include communicable 
diseases, eye problems, heat stress, muscular 
problems, and accidents. Many adverse health 
problems that farmworker families suffer are 
linked directly to their socioeconomic status. 
Poverty forces many farmworkers to live in 
substandard, unsanitary, and overcrowded housing. 
Inadequate housing contributes to the spread of 
bacterial and viral diseases. Farmworkers do not 
have access to adequate health care because they 
lack insurance, time off from work, adequate 
financial resources, ability to communicate in 
English, and health care facilities in their rural 
areas (Migrant Clinicians Network 2008). In 
addition to poor general health, farmworkers are 
employed in one of the most dangerous 
occupations in the country. In 2005 and 2006, 
agriculture had the highest and second highest 
rates of total recordable, nonfatal occupational 
injuries and illnesses among goods-producing 
private industry sectors (US Department of Labor 
2008). Injuries and illnesses in agriculture result 
from machinery accidents, falls, excessive heat, 
repetitive motion, and adverse pesticide exposure. 
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Despite these health disparities, farmworkers 
continue their dangerous labor under a complex 
system of social, legal, and economic policies that 
is deceptive – the illusion of protection may do 
more harm than good. 
Protection through the Free Market 
Proponents of market theory may argue that 
workers who take on hazardous conditions, such as 
farmworkers, are adequately compensated for their 
endeavors. The theory of the compensating wage 
differential assumes that these workers receive 
wages that reflect their acceptance of working 
conditions. Those who are less risk-averse are paid 
correspondingly for jobs that are risky or have bad 
working conditions (Dorman 1996). But the idea of 
compensating wages implies that workers are 
aware of and accept the risks of their occupation. 
Research has shown this is not the case with 
regards to farmworkers and pesticides. 
Farmworkers have little access to the information 
that does exist about pesticides at their workplaces 
and thus are impaired in their ability to make 
informed personal risk assessments (Flocks et al. 
2007). Furthermore, certain health effects, such as 
those related to synergistic and cumulative 
pesticide exposure, are unknown even to scientists 
(Goldman 1995). Even if workers were informed, 
risk perception is normative, both within and 
across industries. As such it is subject to change 
depending on a variety of factors, both individual 
and structural. For example, workers may choose 
risks they understand, feel they can control, or that 
are temporary. There may also be variations on 
risk acceptance according to demographics such as 
gender, class, or ethnicity (Rosen 1986). For 
farmworkers, these implications are important. 
Farmworkers are low-income, ethnic minorities 
who often feel they have little control over their 
workplace (Austin et al. 2001). 
If the theory of compensating wage differentials 
were absolute, there would be no need for 
protective occupational health and safety 
regulation. In fact, such regulation would hinder 
the bargaining process between employees and 
employers. The fact that regulation does exist, 
therefore, must reflect some inherent recognition 
that workers are not always on an even bargaining 
level with employers, and that some intervention is 
needed to put them there. 
Protection through Regulation 
Federal regulation should protect farmworkers 
from pesticide exposure in two ways: directly by 
regulating the conditions of exposure and 
indirectly by providing the resources farmworkers 
need to achieve some control over their working 
conditions. Yet for farmworkers, regulations that 
directly involve pesticide exposure are often 
inadequate, ineffective, or unenforced. In addition, 
farmworkers are exempt from many regulations 
that could afford indirect protection.  
 
Direct regulation. In 1947, the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA; 7 
U.S.C. 136 et seq.) was enacted to ensure the 
effective registration of pesticides containing 
chemical ingredients that had been largely created 
during World War II. In 1970, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) was established and 
FIFRA administration and staff were transferred to 
it from the United States Department of Agri-
culture (USDA). At that time, FIFRA was focused 
mainly on issues such as pesticide labeling and 
registration and not on workplace safety. Later that 
year, the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSH Act; 29 USC 650 et seq.) was signed into 
law. The OSH Act created the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) which had the 
mandate of assuring safe and healthful working 
conditions for the nation’s workers through the 
promulgation and enforcement of occupational 
safety standards. Although it seems logical that 
OSHA would assume regulatory authority over 
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agricultural workplace hazards such as pesticides, 
this was not the case. The OSH Act included a 
clause that prevented the Secretary of Labor from 
regulating working conditions when another 
federal agency had statutory authority to do so. 
The EPA had been moving in the direction of 
regulating agricultural pesticide exposure through 
a series of amendments to FIFRA beginning in 
1972 when it promulgated an early version of the 
Worker Protection Standard (WPS). In the end, the 
authority to regulate pesticides at agricultural 
workplaces was ceded to the EPA. Currently, 
OSHA maintains only a limited role through its 
Field Sanitation Standard (29 C.F.R.1928.110), 
which requires certain agricultural employers to 
maintain minimum sanitation levels through 
provision of handwashing facilities, toilets, and 
drinking water. 
Under the current version of FIFRA, there are 
essentially two avenues of pesticide regulation that 
directly affect farmworkers: the registration and re-
registration processes and the Worker Protection 
Standard (WPS). Authority to implement and 
enforce FIFRA is devolved to the states under a 
system of cooperative federalism whereby the EPA 
maintains authority to ensure that states continue to 
meet the federal standards. FIFRA provides no 
private right of enforcement. The regulation 
regarding registration and re-registration of 
pesticides does not encourage decreased use of 
pesticides nor question the danger of pesticides if 
not supported by data. It does not impede 
marketing of pesticides. However, in order for a 
pesticide to be registered, the EPA must evaluate 
data related to its potential to cause harmful effects 
to humans, wildlife, and the environment. 
There are several concerns regarding the 
registration provisions and data requirements. 
First, FIFRA regulation has always involved a 
cost/benefit analysis that weighs the unreasonable 
risk to humans or environment against the 
beneficial commercial use of the pesticide in 
question. Yet, the adverse effects of pesticides on 
workers are a public health matter and as such it is 
questionable whether it should be subject to an 
economically driven calculation. Second, in 
addressing the proper registration, labeling, and 
seizure of misbranded pesticides, FIFRA depends 
on assurances and studies by manufacturers 
themselves – which creates a conflict of interest. In 
fact, the pressure from pesticide manufacturers and 
agribusiness in the past has resulted in the EPA 
streamlining the registration process. Third, the 
registration process requires an applicant to submit 
test data to EPA demonstrating that the pesticide 
will perform its intended function without 
unreasonable adverse effects, including reports of 
acute and chronic health effects. However, as 
discussed, these data are lacking and there is no 
special consideration for people who work daily 
with these pesticides, such as farmworkers 
(Cunningham-Parmeter 2004, Tool 2001). 
In 1992, the EPA expanded the WPS to include 
not only pesticide handlers but also those 
performing hand labor, making it the most 
important federal regulation to specifically address 
pesticide exposure among farmworkers. Provisions 
of the WPS that relate to informing farmworkers 
about the hazards of pesticides mandate when, 
how, and what information about certain pesticides 
should be posted; the display of a safety poster in a 
central workplace location; and a required 
employee training. Employers are directed, in the 
event of a poisoning, to provide prompt 
transportation from the workplace to an emergency 
medical facility where the employer shall inform 
the treating medical personnel as to the type of 
pesticide involved and the circumstances of 
exposure (40 C.F.R. 170). 
One criticism of the WPS has to do with the 
delegation of its administration and enforcement to 
the states. The anticipated benefit of devolving 
environmental statutes is that decision-making is 
moved closer to an affected public and thus will be 
more efficient and democratic. This again assumes, 
however, that the affected public has full access to 
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information about an issue and that the overseer 
federal agency follows through when needed on its 
ability to withdraw a state’s authority. If this does 
not occur, the fear is that the states will engage in a 
race to the bottom and that a national inconsistent 
pattern of monitoring practices will emerge. In 
2000, the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
reported that this indeed has been the case with the 
WPS (General Accounting Office 2000). When 
WPS requirements such as the provision of basic 
information about pesticides and their application 
are not enforced, the result can be that workers are 
uninformed about chemicals that can potentially 
affect their health. 
 
Indirect regulation. In addition to direct 
regulation of occupational chemicals there are 
regulations that provide protection to workers by 
allowing them to obtain more control over their 
workplaces. For example, workers who can engage 
in dialogue and bargaining with their employers 
are better able to ensure there are adequate health 
and safety measures or that they are being 
proportionately compensated for occupational 
risks. Since the 1930s, the rights of US workers to 
organize, engage in collective bargaining and work 
stoppage methods, and receive a minimum wage 
and overtime pay have been protected by federal 
laws such as those that eventually evolved into the 
National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. But since the inception of these 
laws, farmworkers have been excluded from many 
of their protections under the doctrine of 
agricultural exceptionalism—a practice that has 
historical roots in explicit racial discrimination. 
Agricultural exceptionalism was the result of 
negotiations between Southern politicians seeking 
to protect the agricultural industry’s access to 
cheap, predominately African-American labor and 
the Franklin Roosevelt administration struggling to 
promote New Deal reform. Although the ethnicity 
of farmworkers has changed since this period, the 
legacy of racist policy remains and the result has 
been that while the nation’s other workers are able 
to engage in collective action to increase their 
salaries and improve their working conditions, 
farmworkers often have had to fight just to be paid 
their existing wages (Andrade 2002, Perea 2003). 
 
Other Factors that Complicate Protection 
 
Even when protective regulation does exist, 
agricultural employers often use labor 
arrangements that circumvent regulation. One of 
these practices has been the use of labor 
contractors to recruit, pay, and manage workers, 
who then become subcontractors of their own 
labor. The practice has allowed employers to be 
insulated from workers, shift responsibility for 
occupational safety onto workers, and avoid 
liability for regulatory violations involving matters 
such as training, injuries, and lost wages. 
Another labor arrangement is the temporary 
worker program. These programs have been a 
mainstay of the agricultural industry since the 
1940s, and have recently gained popularity among 
employers concerned about tightening immigration 
controls that could limit their access to cheap 
labor. They benefit employers by ensuring a stream 
of available, documented workers, but they also 
allow those employers to maintain maximum 
control over their workforce while discouraging 
collective action or expression of workers rights. 
The flow of primarily Mexican farmworkers 
into the United States remains constant, despite 
predictions that phenomena such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement and the current 
popular anti-immigrant sentiment would curtail the 
migration. The reason for this is simple - 
farmworker migration from Mexico is tied to the 
US and Mexican economies. When there is a 
demand for farmworkers by US agricultural 
employers there will be a supply of migrants. Yet, 
increasingly strict policies regarding undocumented 
immigration, such as those contained in the USA 
Patriot Act has imposed penalties on those who 
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migrate. Although this policy has not alleviated 
migration levels, it does arouse anxiety and fear 
among migrants, forcing them to go deeper 
underground and remain silent and invisible, even 
when faced with dangerous working conditions 
(Boucher et al. 2005). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Because of unique social, political, and 
economic circumstances, farmworkers have 
limited success in addressing the problem of toxins 
that affect their health. In contrast to other 
environmental justice communities, farmworkers 
have less ability to participate in political decision-
making, less data and access to knowledge about 
occupational hazards, less control over their 
workplaces, and less opportunity to organize and 
challenge the power structure. Farmworkers are 
not adequately compensated for assuming one of 
the riskiest occupations in the nation and the 
limited regulatory protection for farmworkers is 
sophistic. It appears to protect public health, but is 
tainted when economic interests are considered 
above human health. The fact that such limited 
regulation continues to exist is misleading if it 
causes the public to believe that farmworkers are 
protected from potentially carcinogenic substances, 
when they are not. Since existing pesticide policy 
has long had these shortcomings, solutions must be 
extra-regulatory. There must be pressure from the 
affected public and strategies for bringing this 
pressure must be innovative and forward-thinking. 
For example, farmworker and environmental 
justice advocates have had recent success in 
addressing social justice issues with community 
action and legal strategies such as directly 
pressuring specific visible industries; bringing 
lawsuits under legal theories that do not rely on 
proving causation or intent (requirements that have 
caused the downfall of previous environmental 
justice cases); and thrusting cases into a more 
international framework that views environmental 
injustices as human rights violations. These actions 
have been successful because they recognize that 
farmworkers and other environmental justice 
communities do not exist in isolation but are part 
of changing and expanding social and economic 
spheres. 
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